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INTRODUCTION. 
In TNT Worldwide Express (NZ) Ltd v Cunningham1 the Court of 
Appeal reached the conclusion that Cunningham, a courier 
previously working under the direction of, and exclusively for TNT 
Worldwide Express, was unable to invoke a grievance procedure for 
unfair dismissal under the Employment Contracts Act. The reason 
being that such a procedure is only available for 'employees', and 
the court determined Cunningham to be an 'independent 
contractor'. 
Both employees and independent contractors agree to do work and 
receive remuneration for it, however a contract for service 
( employment relationship) gives rise to several statutory and 
common law protective rights and duties that a contract of service 
(independent contract relationship) does not. Case law in the area 
generally involves a party to a work relationship trying to achieve a 
right or impose a duty by classifying the relationship as one of 
employment. The courts however, have been unable to provide a 
single comprehensive and conclusive test to distinguish the vast 
multiplicity of potential work relationships into either a contract of, 
or a contract for, service. Instead a balance of multiple factors and 
an analysis of the entirety of the facts has been used. 
In this paper I will discuss the significance of the distinction 
between employees and independent contractors, the tests used to 
make the distinction, how those tests were applied in 1NI' as the 
most significant of recent New Zealand cases. I will then discuss , 
with particular reference to the writing of Collins2, the advantages 
for an employer in having work relationships defined as contracts 
for service and the inadequacies of the present tests in determining 
who should obtain the protection of employment protection rights. 
I will then discuss the courts reference to 'freedom of contract' as 
justification in not inferring contracts of service and how this 
matches present parliamentary policy. 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISTINCTION. 
The distinction between employee and independent contractor 
carries significant consequences. These can be listed as follows: 
a. Applicability of certain labour law statutes to "employees" 
only, in particular the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
1[1993] 3 NZlR 681. 
2Collins, Hugh Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical 
Disintegration to Employment Protection Laws, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies vol 10, Autumn 1990, no3, 353. 
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b. Industrial instruments such as awards and collective 
agreements apply only to employees and have no relevance 
to independent contractors. 
c. The right to industrial action such as a strike exists only for 
employees, a "strike' by an independent contractor is a 
breach of contract. 
d Certain rights and duties implied under common law such as 
duties of fidelity and confidentiality exist only in the master, 
servant ( employment) relationship3 
e. The employers vicarious liability towards third parties for 
the torts of the employee arise only very rarely in the case 
of an independent contractor. 4 
f. Since the Accident Compensation Act 1982, compensation is 
paid to all earners whether employed or self employed 
(previously self employed earners had to arrange their own 
insurance). However it is significant that the employer must 
pay levies for employees, while independent contractors 
must pay their own levy 
g. Certain superannuation schemes only allow employees to 
participate in. 
h. The employer must deduct PAYE tax from the salary or 
wages of the employee but not the independent contractor, 
who must pay tax as an individual taxpayer. The 
independent contractor may therefore "write off' certain 
expenses as a self employed taxpayer that an employee can 
not.5 . 
The consequences listed above are generally to the advantage of the 
employee, providing the worker with statutory and common law 
protection's for basic work conditions, such as minimum wages, 
holiday pay, sick leave, health and safety standards, maximum 
working hours, recourse for unfair dismissal, union membership 
(voluntary as it is), protection from tortious liability in the case of 
vicarious liability, and the removal of the responsibility for 
administering PAYE and ACC payments. 
For the independent contractor the most obvious advantage of 
being so classified is in receiving payment of fees for work done 
without PAYE being deducted, thus allowing he or she to use or 
invest that money through the financial year, and also allowing 
3szakats, Introduction to Employment Law, Buttenvorths Wellington, 1988 
(3rd ed.) chs 16 and 17. 
4Above n3, eh 18. 
5Ta,xation Review Authority 92/1 59 (1996) 17 NZTC 7,-t.05. 
s 
certain business expenses to be written off at the end of years tax 
return. 
The independent contractor may have other advantages related to 
being free of the traditional workplace constraints and of not being 
tied to a single employer but these do not relate directly to the 
above listed consequences of classification. 
If, therefore, the consequences of 'employee' classification is to 
provide certain 'rights' for employees, these rights must result in 
corresponding 'duties' on employers, such as the duty to pay the 
minimum wage or to comply with health and safety standards. It 
will therefore be to some advantage for an employer to have work 
done by independent contractors rather than employees. It would 
be for independent contractors to contract for the rights provided 
automatically under employer/ employee relationship. 
MAKING THE DISTINCTION. 
STATUTES. 
6 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 defines 'employee' as "any 
person of any age employed by an employer to do any work for 
hire or reward."6 The use of the word "hire" suggests a narrow 
construction which would exclude independent contractors7• The 
definition does expressly include "homeworkers" and persons 
"intending to work" which extends the definition but into only very 
specific categories.8. Other statutes such as The Holidays Act 1981, 
the Wages Protection Act 1983, or the Minimum Wages Act 1983 
define 'worker' for the purposes of that particular statute. 
Statutes use of self referring definitions are of little assistance in 
determining just what is an contract of service, it is therefore 
necessary to look to the courts to provide a definition. 
THE CONTROL TEST. 
In 1880 Bramwell 1J stated the test quite simply by defining a 
servant as "a person subject to the command of his master as to the 
manner in which he shall do his work"9. Since that time 
employment situations have changed greatly, in modern industry 
the employer has to rely on the specialised knowledge and skills of 
the employee, and variation in types of employment arrangements 
is far greater than it was in the previous centaury. Today emphasis 
has shifted from command to merely the "possibility of control"lO 
The fact that the control is not exercised does not negate a 
contract of employment provided there is the right in one 
party to say both what shall be done and how it shall be 
done." 11 
6Employment Contracts Act 1991, s2(1) emphasis added. 
7 Above n3, 21. 
8The courts have had some difficulty in defining 'homeworker,' note the 
differing approaches of the Employment Court in, Cashman and others v 
Central Regional Health Authority [1996] 2 ERNZ 1, and the Court of Appeals 
more expansive approach in Cashman v CRHA unreported Court of Appeal, 26 
August 1996, C.A. 34/ 96. 
9Yewens v Noakes (1880) 6 QBD 530, 532-3. 
lOR Blanpain, B Brooks, C. Engels, Eds Bulletin of Comparative Labour 
Relations Bulletin 24 (Deventer, he Netherlands: Kluwer) 1992, Vranken 
article 128. Short v J and W Henderson Ltd (1946) 6211/R 427,429. 
11Brian Brooks Contract of Employment: Principles of Australian 
Employment Law, (CCH, Australia Ltd, 4th ed, 1992) 20. 
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The control test seems ineffective when an employee possesses 
some special skill or qualification. In a case concerning a circus 
trapeze artist where there was "little room for direction or 
command in detail" the court avoided the problem of lack of direct 
control by suggesting there remained the lawful authority to 
command "if only in incidental or collateral matters"l2. In another 
case concerning the vicarious liability of a hospital for the actions of 
surgeons, Denning IJ extended the control test by suggesting that 
the hospital "have in their hands the ultimate sanction for good 
conduct, the power of dismissal" 13 
While its is agreed that control is an essential factor for the 
determination of a contract of service, with the increasing 
specialistion of employee skills, the courts have found it necessary 
to also look to other elements in the contractual arrangement and 
apply new tests. 
THE INTEGRATION or ORGANISATION TEST. 
This test, devised by Denning IJ, asks whether the person is ''part 
and parcel of the organisation"? The test suggests that if "work 
although done for the business is not integrated into but only 
accessory to it" then a contract for service exists.14 
The meaning of "organisation" and "integration" has been 
questioned as it is unclear from Dennings' IJ formulation. It has 
been suggested that without a clear definition the test is 
meaningless or if the meaning is variable, the test becomes merely 
"a cloak for discretion"lS 
The courts have since rarely relied on or found the organisation 
test to be conclusive, however they have referred to it in their 
decisions.16 
12Zuijs v Wirth Bros Pty Ltd (1955) 93 Cl.R 561,571. and Above nll. 
13Above n3 24 citing Cassidy v Minister of Health [1951] 2 KB 343. 
l4Bank voor Handel en Scheepvast NV v Slatford [1952] 2 All ER 956,971. 
l5Above n3, 26, citing RW Rideout, Principles of Labour Law, 3rd ed (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1979) 8. 
l6Jnspector of Awards v Pacific Helmets (NZ) Ltd, WLC 87/ 88,22 September 
1988, see also the Privy Council decisions of AMP v Chaplin (1978) 52 ALJR 
407, and Narich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (NSW) ( 1983) 50 Al.R 
-+17. 
• 
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THE MIXED AND THE TOTALITY TESTS. 
These test have developed separately yet both reflect a tendency to 
look at several factors rather than one determining criterion. Both 
have been described as a "common sense approach", the mixed test 
looking at 'multiple factors', the totality test looking at 'the total 
situation', the tests are therefore "hardly distinguishable" 17 
Factors to be taken into account from early developments of the 
'mixed test' include: (a) control, (b) the employers power to select 
his servant, (c) the employers right to dismiss, (c) method of 
payment, ( d) ownership of tools, ( e) opportunity for profit, and (f) 
the risk of loss.18 
In the Ready Mixed 19 case McKenna J developed a new 'mixed test' 
by setting out a threefold test; 
A contract of service exists if the following three conditions 
are forfilled; (i) The servant agrees that in consideration of a 
wage or other remuneration he will provide his own work and 
skill in the performance of some service for his master. (ii) He 
agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of that 
service he will be subject to the other's controlling a degree to 
make that other master. (iii) The other provisions of the 
contract are consistent with its being a contract of service.20 
The dictum in the judgement was approved by the English Court of 
Appeal21 and the case has been widely cited in cases in New 
Zealand.22 However the judgement has also been criticised in that 
McKenna J concentrated too heavily on the third element, which is a 
negative requirement ( sometimes referred to as the "consistency 
test"). It is argued that the contract may just as easily contain 
elements that are inconsistent with a contract for service, and that 
the test is circular in that it does not in the first place identify the 
contract of employment.23 
17Vranken article, Above nlO, 128. 
18Above n 2, 26, citing Performing Right society Ltd v Mitchell and Booker 
[1924] 1 KB 762, and, Short v J and W Henderson Ltd Above nlO. 
l9Ready Mixed Concrete Ltd v Minister of Pensions [1968] 1 All ER 433. 
20Above n 19, -1-39 - 4-+0, emphasis added. 
21 Massey v Crown IJfe Insurance Co [1978] 1 WlR 676. 
22Above nl. 
23Above n3, 27, Above nll, 2-1-. 
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The "totality test" more expressly declares that a balancing of 
elements is required in the determination of a contract for, or of, 
service. In Market Investi.gati.ons24 Cooke J. stated: 
[C]ontrol will no doubt always have to be considered, although 
it can no longer be regarded as the sole determining factor; 
and that factors which may be of importance are such matters 
as whether the man performing his service provides his own 
equipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree of 
financial risk he takes, what degree of responsibility for 
investment and management he has, and whether and how far 
he has the opportunity of profiting from sound management 
in the performance of his task. 
The analysis of capital risk or management involvement has also 
been known as the "economic reality test" .zs What Cooke J is 
suggesting is balancing it against control and looking broadly at the 
whole transaction. It has also been said that "no list of tests is 
exhaustive and the weight to be attached to particular criteria 
varies from case to case."26 
The "totality" or "economic reality" test has been adopted by both 
the Privy Council27 and the New Zealand Court of Appeal28 as the 
most definitive method of determining just what is and what is not 
a contract of service. However a test that relies on a case by case 
weighing up of any number of factors suffers greatly form not 
providing certainty in the law. Employers, workers, and agencies 
such as Inland Revenue and Accident Compensation Corporation are 
left unsure of which category any particular work relationship falls 
under29. Further, such an approach is open to the same criticism as 
levelled at Denning's "organisation test", that it is merely a "cloak 
for discretion."30 It has been suggested that the courts assessment 
of the true nature of any work relationship is not an objective 
assessment of the facts of the case in light of the above mentioned 
24Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security [1968] 3 All ER 732, 
738. 
25Above nll, 22 .. 
26construction Industry Training Board v Labour Force Ltd [1970] 3 AllER 
220. 
27Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung [1990] 2 AC 37-1-. 
28Above nl. 
29 As evidenced in Inland Revenues pamphlet IR186, which provides workers 
with two list of questions relating to control, integration and risk elements of 
their arrangement, and then declares that depending on your 'yes' or 'no' 
answers "it will usually mean you are self employed" or "you are probably an 
employee" 
30Above nlS. 
II 
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tests, but in fact, "depends on why the question is being asked"31 
It has been suggested that if the question before the court is 
whether a worker should be allowed a certain tax deduction, then 
the court is likely to find the worker to be an independent 
contractor, however if the question is whether the person who 
engaged the worker should be vicariously liable in tort the court 
may well answer otherwise. A full investigation of the validity of 
this suggestion is unfortunately beyond the scope of this essay. 
INTENTION OF PARTIES. 
The McKenna J 'consistency' decision raised some concerns that it 
would be too easy for parties to introduce inconsistent clauses into 
an agreement. This raises questions as to the intention of the 
parties. However if the parties to an arrangement expressly state 
what the arrangement is (ie employment or independent contract) 
this does not bind the court32. In Simpson v Greaiy33 Stringer J 
stated: 
... we have to disregard particular expressions in the 
agreement, such as "employer" and "contractor" and look at 
the agreement as a whole for the purpose of ascertaining what 
was the real intention of the parties. 
It has been suggested that in cases of ambiguity "so that it can be 
brought under one relationship or other" that the parties stipulation 
as to the type of contract must be given weight.34 It is clear, 
however, that the intention of the parties is but one factor to be 
taken into account by the court and that "the court always reserves 
the right to declare an arrangement to be that of employer and 
employee despite the dear expression of the parties"35 
31A.S. Brooks, 'Myth and Muddle - An E'<amination of Contracts for the 
Performance of Work.' (1988) 11 Vol 2 UNSW Law Journal, 48, Borg v Olympic 
Industries Pty Ltd (1984) AILR 363. 
32Note; the express intention of parties as to the form of their agreement is 
also not seen as conclusive in cases distinguishing lease and licence 
arrangements. Here also, the courts are prepared to look at the entirety of 
the agreement to determine its true form. see Street v Mountford (1985] 1 AC 
809. Radich v Smith (1959) 101 C.LR 209. 
33[1921] NZlR 285. 
34 Massey v Crown life Insurance Co (1978] 1 W1R 676, 680, see also Solomon v 
The King (193-4] NZlR 1 CA 
35 Ferguson v John Dawson and Partners Ltd (1976] 3 All ER 817. 
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TNT AND THE CURRENT POSITION IN NEvV ZEALAND. 
The current approach of the New Zealand courts is expressed in 1NT 
Worldwi.de Express (NZ) Ltd v Cunningham.36 The case is notable 
for many features not least that the decisions of both the 
Employment Tribunal and Employment Court was overturned on 
appeal to the Court of Appeal. In that unanimous decision Cooke P 
described the case as "a test case or a case having extensive 
influence and repercussions" and that "these can be quite difficult 
cases".37 
The Facts. 
Cunningham, the respondent, was engaged by TNT Worldwide 
Express (TNT), the appellant, as an owner-driver to conduct a 
courier service for the company. The contract between the parties 
was a written standard form contract, used by the company for all 
its owner-drivers. TNT terminated the respondents contract. The 
respondent claimed that the termination was unjustified and 
procedurally unfair and sought to invoke the personal grievance 
procedure under the Employment Contracts Act 1991. This 
procedure is only available to employees, not independent 
contractors. The issue, therefore, was whether Cunningham was 
engaged in a contract of service or a contract for service. 
The terms of the agreement required Cunningham to: 
- conduct a courier service over such routes and servicing such 
customers as TNT directed, 
- assist in the handling of goods in transit as required by TNT, 
- provide and maintain a vehicle of a type a colour scheme 
approved by TNT at his own expense (including fuel), 
- to install an approved radio telephone at his own expense, 
- to affix any signs or advertising to the vehicle that TNT may 
require but at TNT's expense. 
- to provide and wear a company uniform, 
- to maintain in full force a goods service licence, 
- to take out company approved insurance for his vehicle and 
goods carried by him or by any person employed by him 
- conduct the courier service in accordance with the directions 
of the company 
- be exclusively tied to the company1 and not conduct any 
other goods or passenger service, 
36Above nl. 
37 Above nl, 683. 
• 
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- be allowed 20 days sick or holiday leave, but ensure that his 
duties are performed by a relief driver at his own expense and, 
- be prohibited from carrying any goods for TNT's clients for 
12 months from the termination of the contract. 
TNT was to remunerate Cunningham mainly on a per trip bases, 
subject to a guaranteed minimum of $2750 per month for months 
other than December and January. The contract also contained a 
clause expressly stating the relationship to be of an independent 
contractor and not an employer and employee. 
The Decision 
The court found that the fact the parties expressly defined the 
relationship they entered into as a contract for services was not 
determinative38. McKay J stated: 
The proper classification of a contractual relationship must be 
determined by the rights and obligations which the contract 
creates and not by the label the parties put on it .... at most the 
label is an indication of the intention of the parties.39 
The Court of Appeal unanimously found that the arrangement was 
that of an independent contractor. Cooke P noted Ready Mixed40 to 
be the closest authority. That case concerned a company's 
arrangements with certain owner-drivers of concrete trucks, Cooke 
P noted some difference in detail (for example the Ready Mixed 
case contained no restraint of trade clause) however, the finding of 
a contract for service was significant.41 McKay J found the present 
case to be "much clearer than Ready Mixed"42 
More significant was the decision of the Privy Council in Lee Ting 
Sang v Chung Chi-Keung43 which Casey J declared as providing 
"authoritative guidance."44 That case cited Cook J of the English 
Court of Appeal in Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social 
Security 45and laid down as a fundamental test the question: 
38see text at above n32 -35. 
39 Above nl 699. 
40Above nl 9. 
41Above nl, 685. 
42Above nl, 700. 
43[1990] 2 AC 374. 
44Above nl, 697 . 
45[1969] 2 QB. 173. 
• .. 
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Is the person who has engaged himself to perform these 
services performing them as a person in business on his own 
account?.46 
Cooke J noted that there is no ·exhaustive list of factors to consider 
in determining the question and then gave a list of potential 
factors4 7 Cooke P stated that this case, as with Ready Mixed 
"appears naturally to meet the test .. "48 
In discussing the lower 'courts' decisions, and the weight they 
applied to the element of control that TNT had over Cunningham, 
Cooke P acknowledged that it is right to attach weight to such 
factors but emphasised that it is no longer the sole determinant.49 
Casey J stated that both the Employment Tribunal and Employment 
Court placed too much emphasis on the control factor, and that such 
a "degree of control was inevitable for the efficient running of such 
a business." Casey J citing Ready Mixed;so 
A man does not cease to run a business on his own account 
because he agrees to run it efficiently or to accept another's 
superintendence. 
Hardie Boys J agreed that such controls are necessary in such a 
"competitive industry" for reasons such as "cohesion", "efficiency", 
and "a high public profile" and then went further to suggest that 
the ''voluntary assumption of such controls in order to gain entry to 
the industry should not be seen as a reason for treating the contract 
as other than what on overall consideration it truly is." And that 
such controls benefit both the 'contractor' and the employer.St 
Cooke P noted factors pointing to a contract for service, while 
expressing them as "inconsistent" with a contract of service in a 
similar manor to McKenna J in Ready Mixed52: 
Particular weight must attach to the provisions for the 
contractor obtaining a goods and service and insurance and 
employing relief drivers: these are substantial obligations 
inconsistent with a contract of service, and they are of such 
obvious importance that they can not merely be put aside in 
analysing the true effect of the contract as a whole.53 
46Above n43, 382. 
47See note at 24 for list of factors. 
48Above nl, 685. 
49Above nl, 687 citing above n43, 382. 
SOAbove nl, 697 citing above n42, -W7. 
S1Above nl 698. 
52Above n42, 
53Above nl, 689 emphasis added. 
14 
McKay likewise found that the contracts provision for a situation 
where the contractor is a limited liability company inconsistent 
with an employer/employee relationship.54 As discussed above the 
"consistency test" has been criticised for relying on circular logicSS 
The court also noted that while it was possible for a contractual 
relationship to evolve with the introduction of new factors, there 
was no evidence of such here. In such a case, where the terms of 
the contract are set out in writing, which is not a sham56, the nature 
of the contract must be determined from the obligations so defined. 
Such a determination is a question of law and not of fact. In cases 
where the contract is not written (which the court notes to be the 
majority of cases in the area) it will be a mixed question of law and 
fact.5 7 
Casey ]. noted the "indivisible and consistent nature" of whatever 
relationship is found to exist between parties, that the relationship 
"cannot be a contract for services for some purposes and contract 
of services for others."58 Casey J also noted as significant that 
parliament had included "homeworkers" in its definition of an 
"employment contract" in the Employment Contracts Act 1991 as 
the only concession extending employment protection rights to 
cases of contracts for services59. And moreover that the 
Government had failed to accept the recommendations of the 
'Gerbic Committee' for the recognition of a new class of "dependant 
and labour only contractor[s]" within the Employment Contracts 
Act.60 
54Above nl,700. 
SSsee text at above n23. 
S6for a discussion of a sham like situation see Agricultural Pilot's Association 
of New Zealand v Southland Aerial Cooperative Society Ltd. ( 1985) ACJ 330. 
Although the court do not make it clear in TNT what is meant by a sham, it is 
assumed to refer to arrangements which are primarily intended to avoid 
employee protection rights. It may be argued that determining whether an 
arrangement is a sham is in fact the function of the courts in such cases. 
57 Above nl, 686, 687, 695 
58Above nl, 694. 
59Above nl, 694. see also above n8. 
60Above nl, 69.-J., see tex't at below n81 for analysis of the Gerbic Committees 
report. 
p 
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THE "COLLINS ARTICLE" 
Three of the five justices in the TNT decision made special 
reference to "the Collins article". 61 Cooke P spending some time 
discussing the article and noting that the results of both the 
Employment Tribunal and Employment Court were only attainable 
"if the present law is developed by a change as advocated in the 
Collins article"62 
Collins is concerned with the recent trend in the United Kingdom of 
"vertical disintegration" in production, with the increased use of 
methods of acquiring labour by means such as sub-contracting, 
concessions and out-sourcing. Casey J notes63 a similar trend in 
New Zealand in part fostered by Part II of the Employment 
Contracts Act, and notable in the courier industry as evident in TNT 
and New Zealand Couriers v Curtin. 64 
Collins notes that regulation of employment relationships (including 
employee protection) evolved alongside vertical integration, and 
that the recent changing trends leaves many workers beyond the 
range of employment protection laws. Collins argues that such 
workers are often subject to the same social subordination and 
economic dependence as other employees and therefore in need of 
employment protection rights. 65 
ACQUISITION OF IABOUR POWER AND TESTS OF CONTRACT STATUS. 
Collins analysis is based on the employers efficient acquisition of 
labour power, for which there are two primary methods; 
( 1) by contractual allocation of risk, whereby the risk of 
inefficiency ( caused by; the worker not working diligently, 
unforseen contingencies hampering the completion of the 
task and, the risk of unavailability of work) .is on the worker 
to give him or her an incentive to provide fair returns, and 
( 2) through bureaucratic control. 
61Above n2. 
62Above nl, 689. 
63Above nl, 694. 
64[1992] 3 NZLR 562 . 
65Above n2, 353-354. 
• 
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Collins argues that the courts use of the three major tests is, in fact, 
an analysis of the efficient acquisition of labour and criticises each 
as; 
RISK. 
1] indeterminate as they do not provide clear criteria for 
settling borderline cases, and 
2] 'dysfunctional' as they deprive workers of needed 
employment protection rights. 66 
When the owner assumes all the risk it is a time service contract 
and the employee is paid an hourly wage for a fixed number of 
hours worked. When the worker assume all the risk it is a task 
performance contract, the contract specifies both the task to be 
completed and the fixed remuneration for it An employer may 
choose a mixture of the two . 
Collins suggests that "the inherent flaw in the economic risk 
analysis ... lies in its assumption that task performance contracts 
rule out the possibility of an employment relationship"67 Collins 
notes examples of task performance contracts such as piece work 
and commission sales which have been classified as employment 
relationships. 68 
Further Collins suggests that '' there is no reason why this link of 
pay to productivity should necessarily determine the workers 
entitlement to employment protection"69 and that an analysis of 
how the standard risks are allocated in a contract does not assist in 
the determination of the workers "degree of economic dependence 
or social subordination" 70 and in fact may be an indication of the 
parties relative bargaining strength rather than the true nature of 
their economic relationship. 
If Collins approach to theiee Ting Sang "risk" or "business in your 
own account" test is to be applied in 1NT, it suggests that where 
TNT arranged a contract that required large capital investment and 
risk by Cunningham, that this also removed Cunningham's 
employment protection rights. 
66Above n2, 371. 
67 Above n2 374 
68Airfix Footwear Ltd v Cope (1978) ICR 1210, Peter F. Burns v Commissioner 
of Stamps ( 1980) 24 SASR 283, Na.rich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax 
(NSW) ( 1983) 50 Al.R -+17. 
69Above n2, 373, see also Muollo v Rotaru [1995] 2 ffi.NZ-l07, -+2-+. 
70Above n2, 365. 
• 
• 
• 
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CONTROL 
Collins looks at the use of bureaucratic controls, and the varying 
costs of such as determined by factors of organisation and the costs 
caused by distancing work from direct supervision. He notes that 
non bureaucratic controls resulting from a particular configuration 
of transactions may, once again, not reveal real relations of 
economic subordination. The presence of bureaucratic controls may 
betray the presence of staggering profit, an imperative for quality 
control or a strong labour movement. 
Collins criticises the control test as; 1] indeterminate as it has never 
established just what type of control will suffice, noting that you 
can not control a skilled crafts person.71, and 2] dysfunctional, being 
both under- and over- inclusive. It is underinclusive for skilled 
and professional workers and by assuming that those on a task 
performance contract are not included in employment relationship 
yet many are such as piece workers and commission sales people. 
It is over inclusive in including dependant entrepreneurs such as 
suppliers of parts to an automobile manufacturer. 72 
ORGANISATION 
The organisation test is criticised as; 1] indeterminate because there 
may be a 'badge of membership' for some purposes, such as 
discipline, but not others such as pensions or taxation. 73 and, 2] 
dysfunctional in that it assumes that in the absence of normal 
badges of membership the worker is an independent contractor. 
which "reveals a naivete with respect to the plentitude of 
mechanisms through which an employer may acquire labour 
power" and that if an employer can acquire labour power without 
incurring the cost of bureaucratic controls, and when there decision 
is influenced by the lower costs of limiting protection rights "it 
seems to make little sense to judge the need of an employees 
protected rights by reference to (the employers) decision"74 
71Above n2, 370, above n12. 
72Above n2, 372. 
73 Above n2, 370. 
74Above n2, 373. 
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PROBLEM OF CHOICE. 
Collins sees a major problem of the three tests arising from the fact 
that it is the management that initiates the search for labour power 
and generally determines the model of contractual relationship that 
exists. It is the management that decides on the demarcations of 
boundaries of organisation through deciding on badges of 
membership, selection of payment mechanisms (risk component) 
and the forms of control. 
Collins sees the courts respecting the parties 'freedom of contract' 
as in fact allowing the employer "the choice to contract into or out 
of the normal incidents of the role of the employer." Collins notes, 
however, that "given .. asymmetry's of bargaining power ... the courts 
are bound to find reasons in some cases for paternalistic 
interventions which involve ignoring the apparent choice of the 
parties" 75 
These rival strands of legal reasoning are considered a "crisis of 
basic legal concepts"76 where the courts try both to respect the 
choice of the parties and to defeat that choice for reasons of public 
policy. 
Collins Suggested Test . 
Collins argues that the solution to determination of the distinction 
between types of contract lies not in referring to the wishes of the 
parties but by purely an act of public policy. He further argues that 
it is for the courts to "shoulder the principal burden"77 The 
legislature being of only minimal assistance as any absolute 
declaration would also become dysfunctional as there are always 
exceptions. Further if parliament declared a standard pattern of 
service arrangement it would only lead to more elaborate 
contractual arrangement to avoid the definition of employee. 
Collins suggests that the courts apply the following test: 78 
Employment exists for the purposes of employment protection 
law if the worker performs services for another, referable to a 
contractual agreement unless that contract satisfies two 
conditions: that it is a task performance contract and that no 
badges of membership of the firms organisation apply. 
75Above n2, 375, emphasis added. 
76Above n2, 355, 375 citing Lord Wedderburn, R Lewis and J. Clark(eds), 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations (Oxford, 1983) 144, 152. 
77 Above n2, 377. 
78Above n2, 379. 
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The Collins approach has a presumption in favour of employment, 
that ignores the express wishes of the party where badges of 
management push toward employment and that deminishes the 
importance of the allocation of risk . 
Collins Test Criticised . 
Collins suggests that the British governments "quest for labour 
market flexibility" 79 (which is clearly a quest held in common with 
the New Zealand legislature as evident in the Employment Contracts 
Act.), and that the declining coverage of employment protection 
legislation "represents in some respects the goal of the 
Governments policy of labour market flexibility"80 
Ironically this suspicion, if true, only weakens his contention that it 
is for the courts to change the present situation, as it is not for the 
courts to go against the intention of parliament. 
With the courts being so restrained, it is therefore for parliament to 
make any changes. 
THE GERBIC COMMITTEE. 
In 198 7 the Minister of Labour set up a committee to enquire into 
"dependant contracting" 81. The committee identified 'dependant 
contractors' as falling within the employee and independent 
contractor distinction, and as being characterised by a; 
substantial degree of dependence upon a principal employer 
such as to give rise to the presumption that there is an 
inappropriate balance of bargaining abilities and equity 
between the parties to the contract11 82 
Union submissions called for a change to the Labour Relations Act 
1987 and considered 'dependant contracting' as "the manifestation 
of a deliberate policy of some employers, the aim of which is to 
deny people the right to award wages" and that a feature of these 
contracts is the ' all or nothing', 'take it or leave it' method of 
79Above n2, 361. 
80Above n2, 361. 
8Icommittee Enquiring into Dependant Contracting (Gerbic Committee) 
(1988) Dept of Labour . 
82Above n81, 2. 
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negotiation where the employer transfers the risk of employment 
onto the employee.83 
Employer submissions were based upon "utilitarian concepts of 
freedom of choice, freedom of contract and the rights of the 
individual". 84 Employers stated that contractors have the choice of 
becoming a contractor with the inherent potential for profit or risk 
of loss and that there is no place for protection of the weak 
contractor in an open environment. Employers noted concerns 
about any arbitrary definition of dependant contractors as being 
unfair and unequitable, in being likely to capture those who are not 
dependant and leave out some who are. 
The Commission also received submissions from 'dependant 
contractors' such as owner-drivers who generally were in favour of 
changes, such as; greater equality of bargaining power, greater 
ability to enforce contracts, and more effective methods of dispute 
resolution. 
For policy reasons the committee wished to impose minimal 
changes to the operation of the labour market and to avoid 
prescriptive or peremptory solutions. The committee wished to 
provide 'dependant contractors' with access to dispute resolution 
and grievance procedures of the labour Relations Act. as well as 
strengthen their bargaining position by allowing them to underpin 
the negotiated contract rate with the award rate for the type of 
work. 
The committee's proposal involved an extension of the definition of 
"worker" to include a "permissive definition" of labour only and 
dependant contractors under the then labour Relations Act. The 
committee did not favour a substantive definition of 'dependant 
contractor' to be included in the Act, instead favouring the issue to 
be a matter to be negotiated between the parties. 
Gerbic Criticised 
The flaw in the Committee's suggestion is the failure to recognise 
two features of the current trend toward increasing use of 
independent contract relationships. One being the absence of 
employment relationship consequences being a motivation for 
employers in seeking such relationships, the second being the 
83Above n81, 3. 
84Above n81, 3. 
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dominant bargaining position of employers. Leaving the "matter to 
be negotiated between the parties" will be most ineffective in cases 
that are in the greatest need of protection. It is unlikely that a 
worker who is unable to negotiate such protective provisions will 
be able to negotiate that their relationship be defined as that of 
"dependent contractor." 
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DISCUSSION 
Advantages of Classification. 
Hardie Boys J decision in 1NT declared that "there are many 
reasons why both employer and contractor prefer the independent 
contractor arrangement".85 These advantages are worthy of 
consideration. 
Advantage for the Contractor. 
Cooke P noted that "the witness Mr Mabin, evidently lik[ed] the 
earning opportunities" 86, Hardie Boys J himself did not offer any 
reference to actual advantages. Advantages seem to be securing a 
job and its associated returns that would be otherwise unavailable. 
It is not imagined that the court is suggesting that a workers desire 
for work with reasonable income should deprive him or her of 
employment protection rights. 
Advantages for the Employer/ Owner . 
McKay J notes advantages of independent contractors being 
responsible for their own income tax and GST returns, as well as 
being outside the ambit of labour law regulations.87 Further to 
these advantages, much of the companies potential capital outlay is 
transferred onto the independent contractor, including; vehicle, 
fuel, radio and uniform costs, as well as certain administration costs 
involved in training and providing replacement drivers, which the 
courier him or her-self must provide and pay for. 
Collins suggests other advantages such as; independent contractors 
providing a buffer for employers from market fluctuations, 
allowing greater flexibility in raising and lowering the size of the 
workforce, possibly allowing lower wage costs, 88 and avoiding long 
term contractual relationships and therefore providing bargaining 
power to the employer who may impose stricter contractual 
control.89 
Collins argues that the advantages for the employer of having work 
performed by independent contractors is in fact the reason for 
85 Above n 1, 698. 
86Above n 1, 689. 
87 Above n 1, 699, see also "List of Consequences" pages 3 and 4. 
88see for example Cashman, above n8, where caregivers were receiving 
around $-l per hour. 
89Above n2, 356 
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'vertical disintegration' rather than merely a consequence of it.90 
He suggests that employers in dominant bargaining positions are 
favouring independent contract relationships to avoid obligations 
under employment contracts. 
It is acknowledged that contracts for service generally have low 
levels of control or direct supervision imposed on the worker, and 
that if too much direct control is exerted the courts are likely to 
find that an employment relationship exists. However the test 
seems to ignore that the independent contract arrangement may 
impose greater control than employment when, as in TNT, the work 
is done away from direct supervision.91 
In Muollo v Rotaru92 the appellant, the owner of a fishing boat, 
contended that the respondent, a fisher, was an independent 
contractor. As evidence to support the fishing industries use of 
independent contract arrangements the appellant gave six 
economic reasons why such arrangements are used. Among these 
were a recognition of the intermittent and uncertain duration of 
work, and that the employer did not want the liability of an 
employee when work was not available, further the appellant did 
not want to be liable for holiday or sick pay, and enjoyed the 
encouragement of "proper work attitudes" that a independent, 
commission based pay arrangement provided. These are clear 
examples of the advantages for employers envisaged by Collins 
under a contract for service. Interestingly Goddard CJ found these 
advantages to be "forceful arguments" to legitimise the industries 
use of independent contract relationships rather than indicating 
that the industries use of such arrangements was 'sham'93 like, 
being primarily motivated by the desire to avoid standard 
employer obligations. 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT. 
The courts decision in TNT ultimately relies on the concept of 
freedom of contract, that the contract was not a sham, and that the 
90Above n2, 356. 
91Above n2, 375, Collins notes that in Ready Mixed the task performance 
contract was functionally the same as a time service contract that created 
even superior control when the nature of the work prevented constant 
supervision. 
92Above n69, 426. 
93see above n56. LAW LIBR,-...h"' ~-
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court must honour the parties free choice "without paternalistic 
intervention"94 
In TNT Cooke P noted that "the fact the company enjoyed economic 
bargaining strength .. ( can not be) .. treated as evidence that he is 
not an independent contractor"95 In comparison Collins treated an 
owners bargaining strength as evidence of an inequality that 
allowed the owner to contract into or out of employment protection 
rights.96 
As noted above there are times when the court has gone against 
parties express wishes and declared a contract to be other than 
what it is stated to be.97 There are times, therefore when 
"paternalistic intervention" of the courts is required. Collins 
suggests that the courts should intervene to declare contract to be 
'for services' when there is a need for employment protection 
rights, the courts however see it as necessary when the worker is 
not in business on his or her own account. 
CHANGE? 
Cooke P suggested in 1NI' that the result arrived at by the 
Employment Tribunal and Employment Court was only possible if 
the approach of Collins was adopted, and stated; 
In my opinion the Courts should not shrink from such a 
development should a reconsideration of common law 
decisions show them to be untenable or unsatisfactory in 
principle, provided however that the development is not 
contrary to legislative principle.98 
Any change in approach therefore requires a change in legislative 
policy. Clearly a legislative change will not then require the courts 
to be satisfied that common law decisions have been "untenable or 
unsatisfactory in principle". However, achieving such a change will 
require the legislature to be so satisfied. 
A.S. Brooks99suggests that the contract of employment; can not be 
defined, is indistinguishable from other contracts for the 
94Above nl, 698. 
95 Above nl, 685. 
96Above n2, 375. 
97 Above n32, n38 and n76. 
98Above nl , 687. 
99 Above n31. 
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petformance of work, and has no indispensable part to play in the 
allocation of statutory benefits. She suggests that the distinction 
between contracts for and contracts of service be abandoned and 
there be only "contracts for the perlormance of work" to which the 
present statutory rights and duties for employment contracts 
should apply. She suggests that while costs in industries that 
presently use independent contracts may rise, such a social cost 
would be less than the social cost of leaving such workers 
unprotected. loo 
Right wing proponents of labour market flexibility, ironically may 
agree with Brooks that the distinction between contracts of and for 
service is meaningless. However, such proponents will differ by 
wishing to treat all employees as independent contractors, removed 
from all statutory protection and subject to work conditions 
determined by the free market. 
It is contended here that neither approach is appropriate. The 
Brooks approach is highly unlikely in the current 'free market' 
political climate. Further, the imposition of statutory burdens upon 
two truly independent business people may be unreasonable. 
Collins notably saw the inclusion of even dependant entrepreneurs 
in the definition of employees as undesirable.101 It is also notable 
that the Brooks approach would require a definition that 
distinguishes "contracts for the performance of work" from other 
contracts such as "contracts for the supply of goods." It may be 
difficult to distinguish contracts for the supply of a completed 
product to an industry and contracts for work to complete that 
same product. 
A completely free market approach is also undesirable as there is a 
clear need for statutory protection of workers. Employee 
protection was developed to counter potentially harsh results 
caused by the power imbalance in the labour market. Statutory 
protection of those in weak bargaining positions is not unusual, 
examples being found in consumer and tenancy protection 
legislation.102 
The law recognises that often an agreement will be legitimately 
reached with one party enjoying "economic bargaining strength".103 
lOOAbove n31 100. 
101Above n2 372. 
102consumer Guarantees Act 1993, Fair Trading Act 1986, and Residential 
Tenancy Act 1986. 
103 Above nl 685. 
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However the law also recognises that for certain arrangements, 
inequities in bargaining strength need to be balanced through 
statutory protection of the weaker party. 
The greatest need for some form of protection in the independent 
contract relationship is that of the dependant contractor, as 
recognised by the Gerbic Committee. Such relationships are defined 
by the employer, the worker accepting the standard arrangement, 
having little or no bargaining strength and being solely dependant 
on the employer for work. 
Changing Legislative Policy. 
Casey J noted in 1NT the comments of the Chief Judge in New 
Zealand Dairy Workers Union v Southern Milk Co Ltd104 that the 
most significant thing about the Gerbic Report was the failure of the 
Government to accept its recommendations. The Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 ignored the Gerbic recommendations, being 
greatly motivated by free market and freedom of contract ideals. 
There may be however, an increased potential for change in 
Employment Law in general under the up coming MMP system. 
Form of Change 
Creating new division(s) for work relationships may suffer from 
difficulty in providing conclusive definitions for the scope of such 
divisions. Presently such divisions exist with the statutory 
inclusion of "Homeworkers" in the definition of employees under 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991. As noted earlier the 
Employment Court and the Court of Appeal have differed in their 
approach to defining homeworker in the recent case of Cashman v 
CRHA.105 While this may point to further uncertainty in the area, 
alternatively the case can be seen as a test case with the Court of 
Appeal extending protection to those "vulnerable and susceptible of 
manipulation" .106 
Further difficulty may also arise from employers use of more 
elaborate contractual arrangements in an effort to evade such a 
statutory division. However, any such evasion will be more 
104[1989] 1 NZl.R 865, 873. 
105Above n8. 
106Above n8 C.A. 34/ 96 at 12. 
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difficult for employers than merely evading the employment 
definition. Moreover, where the division is defined by a lack of 
bargaining power or a form of subordination, employers efforts to 
avoid such a classification will necessarily involve increasing the 
workers bargaining power, or removing forms of subordination. 
CONCLUSION. 
The decision in 1NT was described by Cooke P to be in a "difficult 
area" of the law. Common law courts have had great difficulty in 
formulating a consistent approach in distinguishing contracts of 
service from contracts for service. Statutes are of no real assistance 
and the common law tests are each open to criticism. The courts 
are left to make (some would say discretionary) decisions based on 
how the specific factors of each case point to the parties intentions. 
In TNT this saw the court uphold an "established status in the 
transport industry" 107 by finding the respondent to be an 
independent contractor and therefore unable to invoke certain 
grievance procedures. 
The current trend toward contracts for service is in part motivated 
by the advantage to employers of avoiding statutory protection and 
of transferring some liability onto the independent contractor who 
would otherwise (if an employee) be a liability. Given the common 
the use of 'standard form', 'take or leave it' contract negotiation by 
employers as evidenced in TNT, employers have the ability to 
mould the labour market to their advantage. It is recognised that 
the courts will not accept a contract that is an obvious "sham". 
However where the practice of using independent contractors 
within an industry has achieved an "established status", the courts 
are clearly willing to accept it. This may disregard that the 
development of such a practice was motivated by the same 
anticipated advantages as those that motivate the employer who 
creates an individual sham contract. 
The decision in 1NT may well reflect current legislative free 
market policy. It is suggested here, however, that there is a need 
for statutory protection to be extended to "dependant contractors" 
who are disproportionately vulnerable and in need of a balancing of 
their bargaining power with that of their "employers". 
107 Above nl 689. 
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